They are always critical in economic terms

What are even transatlantic relations at a time where the world is switching to the "Pacific century" and where the very notion of the West seems to dissolve, at the time of globalization and the intermingling of cultures

Transatlantic relations are historically passed by four phases. The first from 1949 to 1989, that of the cold war, characterized by an undeniable success. The "containment" strategy, set in 1947 by George Kennan, to contain the Soviet threat, until, a victim of its own contradictions, the "evil empire" collapsed on itself.

The second phase, from 1989 to 2001, which concludes with the September 11, appears in retrospect to the Alliance as one of "missed opportunities". Orphaned cement made up of the Soviet threat, the Alliance has is sought a reason to be and was not up to the challenges which it faced. The reunited Europe did not emerge as a power United, decisive and responsible to the return of the war in the Balkans. America which had then all maps has largely wasted them by lightness and unconsciousness of what could be a short and fragile's "unipolar moment."

The third phase, from 2001 to 2008, the end of the second term of the Bush Presidency, is no longer one of missed opportunities but dangerous skids. These drift - the Iraq to the Afghanistan, not to mention the geopolitical consequences of the financial crisis - will accelerate the rise of China and, behind it, emerging powers. They will also strengthen tensions if the divisions between partners. Europe is no longer the first line of defence of the United States and nothing divides more than failure.

A fourth phase of transatlantic relations has opened before us. They are always critical in economic terms. Just consider the importance of exchanges between the two shores of the Atlantic. But they become still more secondary on the strategic plan. Can what lessons we draw, today, to the emergence of Asia, successes and failures of the past

The key is to understand the radically new nature of the challenge of China. The Middle Kingdom is not the USSR. It is not an ideological opponent. In fact, despite the Communist name of his regime, China is post-idéologique. Managed as a business, it means impose us its system nor invade us. It is both a vital to our growth and a rival ambitious and essential economic partner. It is also a country double behaviour alternating words or provocative actions on the regional scene, for example, the Japan or silences and convicted abstentions the North Korea or the Iran. Because China is alternatively too much or not enough, America must be the "regional balance" both in Asia and the "default superpower" at the global level.

In 1995, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the leaders of the Alliance had found a formula which summarized well their policy towards the Russia: "integrate it if we can, the contain if we must." Today, the problem is very different from that of yesterday. How to "integrate" a power which, at the bottom of itself, feels superior to those who want to convince her at the same time to show more restraint in China Sea and take more responsibility on the international scene

It is today that America would need a Kissinger, diplomatic history buff and disciple of Bismarck, could be a real strategic dialogue with Chinese leaders. Its "European sophistication" better suited the world today than that of the cold war.

But in his pursuit of a "China strategy", America feels well only and wondered what still serves the Alliance. Because if the United States is not forced to the relative decline of their power, Europe seems to resignation and even meet.